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Jessica Fisher* 
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association: 
“Modern Warfare” on First Amendment 
Protection of Violent Video Games 
Introduction 
In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association,1 the Supreme Court of 
the United States struck down a California law that restricted violent video game 
sales to minors because the law infringed upon constitutionally protected speech 
and the legislature had neither a compelling government interest nor proscribed 
means narrowly tailored to that interest.2 The Court held that the California law was 
unconstitutional because the law placed restrictions on free speech, protected by the 
First Amendment, and those restrictions did not pass strict scrutiny.3 The Court 
determined that the California law did not pass strict scrutiny because strict 
scrutiny requires that California show an actual state interest in restricting speech 
and that the law is as narrowly tailored as possible to serve that interest.4 The Court 
clearly stated that California could not meet this heavy burden.5 However, in its 
opinion, the Court too hastily concluded that video games should be treated the 
same as other media of speech such as radio broadcasts, print publications, and 
television without further considering their relatively new and uniquely interactive 
qualities.6 The Court should have deferred to the legislature and experts who study 
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 1. 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
 2. Id. at 2738–39, 2741. 
 3. Id. at 2738. 
 4. See infra Part IV.A (arguing that the Supreme Court came to the correct conclusion when it 
determined that the California law attempted to regulate the content of violent video games, which are a form 
of speech that is protected by the First Amendment. A law seeking to place limits on the content of protected 
speech must pass strict scrutiny, and the California law was unable to meet this standard). 
 5. See infra Part IV.A. 
 6. See infra Part IV.B (arguing that the Court should not have so quickly dismissed the new and evolving 
medium of violent video games as the same as other media of expression such as books, radio broadcasts, and 
motion pictures). 
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video games and their effects before quickly determining that this rapidly-
advancing and increasingly interactive technology presents no new challenges to the 
First Amendment jurisprudence of freedom of speech.7 In the future, states that 
wish to restrict violent video game sales to minors should more narrowly tailor 
statutes to very specific depictions of violent situations that also include obscenity 
for a better chance of meeting the strict scrutiny that is required of laws that 
infringe upon First Amendment rights.8 
I. The Case 
Respondents, Video Software Dealers Association (VSDA) and Entertainment 
Software Association (ESA), brought an action against Petitioners, various 
members of the California state government,9 alleging that California Civil Code §§ 
1746–1746.5 (“the Act”) was unconstitutional.10 The Act prohibited the sale or 
rental of violent video games to minors without parental permission and required 
that merchants of these games display a specific symbol on the front packaging of 
the video game.11 Specifically, VSDA and ESA alleged that (1) video games are a 
form of speech protected by the First Amendment, (2) the definition of “violent 
video game” is vague, and (3) the provision of the Act requiring violent video games 
to be labeled in this manner violates the First Amendment.12 
In crafting this legislation, California State Senator Leeland Yee unsuccessfully 
attempted to create a law that prohibited the sale of violent video games to minors.13 
Former California Governor, Arnold Schwarzenegger, signed California Assembly 
Bill 1179 of 2005 into law on October 7, 2005,14 and it was to take effect on January 
1, 2006, as California Civil Code §§ 1746–1746.5.15 The Act provided that “[a] 
person may not sell or rent a video game that has been labeled as a violent video 
 
 7. See infra Part IV.B. 
 8. See infra Part IV.C (arguing that a state should closely tailor a statute restricting the distribution of 
violent video games to minors by targeting very particular portrayals of obscenity such as nudity, rape, and 
other crimes of a sexual nature). 
 9. Respondents were Arnold Schwarzenegger, former Governor of California; Bill Lockyer, former 
Attorney General of California; George Kennedy, former District Attorney for Santa Clara County; Richard 
Doyle, former City Attorney for the City of San Jose; and Ann Miller Ravel former County Counsel for the 
Country of Santa Clara. Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1037–39 (N.D. 
Cal. 2005). 
 10. Video Software Dealers Ass’n, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 1039. 
 11. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1746–1746.5 (West 2006), invalidated by Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 
2729 (2011). 
 12. Video Software Dealers Ass’n, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 1039. 
 13. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2742 (2011); A.B. 1179, 2005–06 Leg. Sess. (Ca. 2006). 
 14. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2732. California Assembly Bill 1179 of 2005 was to become California Civil Code § 
1746–1746.5. Cal. Assemb. B. No. 1179, 2005 Leg., 2005 Sess. (Cal. 2005). 
 15. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1746–1746.5 (West 2009). 
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game to a minor,”16 and defined “violent video game” as “a video game in which the 
range of options available to a player includes killing, maiming, dismembering, or 
sexually assaulting an image of a human being.”17 The Act also imposed a 
requirement that violent video games be labeled with an “18” of a specific size and 
color on the front packaging of the video game.18 A merchant or owner of a business 
who violated any provision of the Act is subject to a fine of up to $1,000.19 
Shortly after former Governor Schwarzenegger signed California Assembly Bill 
1179,20 VSDA and ESA filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of California and a motion for preliminary injunction soon after, 
seeking to prevent the enforcement of the Act.21 The District Court held that the 
costs of implementing the Act, including the infringement of First Amendment 
rights and expenses associated with the implementation of the Act, outweighed the 
potential harm of a delay in the implementation of the Act.22 The District Court 
granted VSDA and ESA’s motion for preliminary injunction and enjoined 
California from enforcing the Act.23 Next, VSDA and ESA moved for summary 
judgment and for enforcement of the Act to be permanently enjoined.24 The United 
States District Court for the Northern District of California held that the Act was 
unconstitutional, granted summary judgment, and permanently enjoined 
Petitioners from enforcing the Act on August 6, 2007.25 The Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court.26 The court of appeals 
concluded that the Act was a content-based regulation subject to strict scrutiny and 
was presumptively invalid, because, despite the State demonstrating a compelling 
 
 16. CIV. § 1746.1 (providing that: “(d)(1) ‘Violent video game’ means a video game in which the range of 
options available to a player includes killing, maiming, dismembering, or sexually assaulting an image of a 
human being, if those acts are depicted in the game in a manner that does either of the following: 
(A) Comes with the following descriptions: (i) A reasonable person, considering the game as a whole, would 
find appeals to a deviant or morbid interest of minors. (ii) It is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the 
community as to what is suitable for minors. (iii) It causes the game, as a whole, to lack serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value for minors. (B) Enables the player to virtually inflict serious injury upon images of 
human beings or characters with substantially human characteristics in a manner which is especially heinous, 
cruel, or depraved in that it involves torture or serious physical abuse to the victim”). 
 17. CIV. § 1746.  
 18. CIV. § 1746.2. 
 19. CIV. § 1746.3. 
 20. Cal. Assemb. B. No. 1179, 2005 Leg., 2005 Sess. (Cal. 2005). 
 21. Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1034, 1039 (N.D. Cal. 2005), 
aff’d, No. C-05-04188 RMW, 2007 WL 2261546 (N.D. Cal. 2007), aff’d, 556 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 2009), aff’d 
sub nom. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
 22. Id. at 1048. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, No. C-05-04188 RMW, 2007 WL 2261546, at *12 
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2007), aff’d, 556 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 2009), aff’d sub nom. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 
131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
 26. Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 967 (9th Cir. 2009), aff’d sub nom. 
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
 Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n 
528 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
interest to protect the physical and psychological well-being of minors, it did not 
tailor the restriction to the least-restrictive means possible to achieve this purpose.27 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide if the Act comported with the 
First Amendment of the Constitution.28 
II. Legal Background 
In order for a challenged legislative act that restricts historically protected speech to 
be declared constitutional, the State must show that the legislature has a compelling 
government interest to protect and that the act is narrowly tailored to protect that 
interest.29 There are limited categories of speech that historically have not qualified 
for First Amendment protection such as speech that incites violence,30 fighting 
words,31 advocacy of illegal conduct,32 defamation,33 and obscenity.34 New categories 
that have not been historically unprotected cannot be added to this list.35 Depictions 
of violence have been traditionally protected,36 and violent video games qualify as 
speech that is protected by the First Amendment.37 Legislative acts that propose 
restrictions on speech must pass strict scrutiny.38 The plaintiff has the burden of 
 
 27. Id. at 965. 
 28. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2732 (2011). 
 29. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395–96 (1992) (holding that an ordinance that is overbroad 
does not pass the strict scrutiny required by statutes that restrict First Amendment freedom of speech). 
 30. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448–49 (1969) (holding that inflammatory speech that is likely to 
produce imminent lawless action is not protected by the First Amendment). 
 31. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573–74 (1942) (holding that words uttered with the 
purpose to inflict injury or immediately incite an immediate breach of the peace are of no social value and are 
part of a category of speech not protected by the First Amendment). 
 32. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (introducing the “Clear and Present Danger Test” and 
holding that speech that advocates for immediate and illegal action is not protected by the First Amendment). 
 33. See generally New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283–86 (1964) (stating a test to determine 
instances of libel, or defamation, against a public figure). 
 34. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957) (holding that speech whose “dominant theme . . . taken 
as a whole appeals to the prurient interest” is a category of speech that is not protected by the First 
Amendment). 
 35. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586 (2010) (holding that “depictions of animal cruelty” is 
not a class of speech that has been historically unprotected by the Constitution, and this new class cannot be 
created and added to the list of existing unprotected classes of speech that have a long history of being excluded 
from the protections of the First Amendment) (internal quotations omitted). 
 36. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734 (2011) (discussing that the obscenity exception 
to the First Amendment only covers depictions of sexual conduct and not what the legislature finds to be 
shocking or violent). See generally Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (determining that to be 
considered obscenity, speech must appeal to the prurient interest, which puts it outside of First Amendment 
protection); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (discussing how in order to be considered obscenity, 
the speech must be erotic); Roth, 354 U.S. at 489 (providing that obscenity must have an element that applies to 
the prurient interest). 
 37. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2736 (“California’s argument would fare better if there were a longstanding 
tradition in this country of specially restricting children’s access to depictions of violence, but there is none.”). 
 38. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992); see Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving 
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1972) (discussing 
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showing that (1) government has an actual interest that it wishes to protect,39 and 
(2) the act was narrowly drawn to protect this interest.40 
A. Depictions of Violence Are One of the Historically Protected Categories of Speech, 
and Violent Video Games Qualify for First Amendment Protection 
The First Amendment provides protection for speech stating, “Congress shall make 
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the 
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances.”41 The Free Speech Clause prohibits restrictions on an individual’s 
freedom of speech, which has historically been recognized to include 
entertainment.42 The First Amendment protects entertainment including books, 
plays, radio broadcast, television, and movies.43 As technology continues to advance, 
the freedom of speech has been extended to video games.44 The First Amendment 
protects these media, because “[a]s a general matter, . . . government has no power 
to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its 
content.”45 
There are exceptions to the general rule that the First Amendment protects 
speech. Historical categories of unprotected speech exist: speech that incites 
violence,46 fighting words,47 advocacy of illegal conduct,48 defamation,49 and 
 
the relatively vigorous level of scrutiny requires that the means of legislation must substantially further the ends 
of the legislation in order for the legislation to pass the strict scrutiny that the First Amendment requires). 
 39. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000) (“If a statute regulates speech 
based on its content, it must be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government interest.”) (citing Sable 
Commc’ns of California, Inc. v. FCC et al., 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (providing that “[t]he Government may, 
however, regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it 
chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest” and determining that there is a 
governmental interest in protecting the well-being of minors)). 
 40. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 395; see generally Gunther, supra note 38 (discussing how one of the requirements of 
strict scrutiny is that an act that infringes on speech must be narrowly drawn so that the means of the act 
support its ends). 
 41. U.S. CONST. amend. I, § 1. 
 42. Patrick M. Garry, Defining Speech in an Entertainment Age: The Case of First Amendment Protection for 
Video Games, 57 SMU L. REV. 139, 148 (2004). 
 43. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501–02 (1952) (concluding that just because books, 
newspapers, magazines, and motion pictures are produced and sold for a profit does not mean that they are 
outside of the protection of the first amendment and providing that motion pictures are another medium of 
speech that is granted protection by the First Amendment). 
 44. See generally id. (discussing that first amendment protections of speech do not change depending on 
the type of medium through which the speech is expressed and stating, “[t]hat books, newspapers, and 
magazines are published and sold for profit does not prevent them from being a form of expression whose 
liberty is safeguarded by the First Amendment”). 
 45. Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (internal quotations omitted) (citing 
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983) (quoting Police Dep’t. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 
U.S. 92, 95 (1972))). 
 46. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
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obscenity.50 Although this list is not exhaustive, the categories of unprotected speech 
are limited to those that have a history of not being protected or contribute little 
social value.51 Depictions of violence are one of the categories of speech that have 
been historically protected by the First Amendment, although there have been 
attempts to censor speech in this area over the decades.52 Specifically, governments 
have attempted to prove that motion pictures are outside of the First Amendment’s 
protections.53 However, the Court held in Joseph Burnstyn, Inc. v. Wilson that even 
though movies could pose a different type of danger to minors than other media of 
speech before them, movies do not require “unbridled censorship” and exclusion 
from First Amendment protection.54 
The Supreme Court recently held in United States v. Stevens that absent a 
historical precedent of protection of a particular category of speech, new categories 
of unprotected speech may not be added.55 In Stevens, Respondent, Robert J. 
Stevens, a small-time author and producer, challenged his arrest under a statute 
that criminalized the commercial creation, sale, or possession of depictions of 
animal cruelty.56 This type of video production was declared illegal under the law, 
and Stevens was convicted in the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania and given a 37-month jail sentence in 1999 for his 
involvement in those productions.57 
The Supreme Court held in Stevens, a statute that criminalized the commercial 
sale, possession, and depiction of animal cruelty was invalid under the First 
Amendment because it was substantially overbroad.58 In the reasoning of the 
 
 47. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 48. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 49. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 50. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 51. See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586 (2010) (“Our decisions . . . cannot be taken as 
establishing a free-wheeling authority to declare new categories of speech outside the scope of the First 
Amendment. Maybe there are some categories of speech that have been historically unprotected, but have not 
yet been specifically identified or discussed as such in our case law. But if so, there is no evidence that 
‘depictions of animal cruelty’ is among them.”). 
 52. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 518–20 (1948) (discussing that violence is not part of the obscenity 
that the Constitution is permitted to regulate, and concluding that the statute in this case restricting the 
possession of certain magazines contained no unconstitutional obscenity). 
 53. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501–02 (1952). 
 54. Id. at 502. 
 55. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1584 (holding that absent a historical background of protection, new categories of 
speech may not be added to the already designated categories of unprotected speech). Stevens was decided only 
a few days before Brown, and it has created a lot of controversy in Free Speech jurisprudence, but, as the Court 
affirmed in Brown, new categories of unprotected speech may not be created “absent a long . . . tradition of 
proscription.” Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734 (2011). 
 56. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1582–83 (discussing a law that sought to provide that depictions where an animal 
is being maimed, mutilated, tortured, wounded, or killed is not protected by the First Amendment). 
 57. Id. at 1584. 
 58. Id. at 1592. 
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opinion, Chief Justice Roberts relied heavily on the notion that there are only a few 
limited categories of unprotected speech.59 In the opinion, Chief Justice Roberts 
emphasized that when the Court has identified categories of speech that are outside 
of First Amendment protection, it is not done simply on the basis of cost-benefit 
analysis, as the Government alleged in this case, but instead there must be some 
other compelling interest in protecting a class of individuals.60 Ultimately, the Court 
“decline[d] to carve out from the First Amendment any novel exception for [the 
Statute] . . . ,” therefore, depictions of animal cruelty are protected by the First 
Amendment.61 
As Stevens illustrates, there have been recent attempts to add more categories of 
unprotected speech that have been unsuccessful.62 Although there may be new and 
undiscovered categories of unprotected speech added to the list, states have been 
more successful in expanding existing categories of unprotected speech.63 For 
example, the Court in Ginsberg v. New York expanded the category of obscenity to 
include distribution of pornography to minors.64 The Court was careful to note that 
this was merely an expansion of obscenity by adding the words “to minors” to an 
already constitutional prohibition on speech, and a new category of unprotected 
speech was not created.65 Thus, courts have held that depictions of violence in 
various media are protected speech.66 
Attempts by states to censor violent video games are relatively new and legal 
action relating to video game violence did not develop until the mid-1990s and 
early 2000s, and none have been successful at categorizing violent video games as an 
unprotected category of speech.67 Partially due to the urging of Senators Lieberman 
and Krohl over concerns of violence portrayed in video games, the video game 
industry established the Entertainment Software Rating Board (ESRB) as a means of 
self-censorship in the videogame industry.68 However, there was no litigation 
surrounding violent video games and the debate about their censorship did not heat 
 
 59. Id. at 1584–85. 
 60. See id. at 1585. 
 61. Id. at 1586. 
 62. See id. at 1584 (“Maybe there are some categories of speech that have been historically unprotected, but 
have not yet been specifically identified or discussed as such in our case law. But if so, there is no evidence that 
‘depictions of animal cruelty’ is among them.”). 
 63. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637 (1968) (holding that a statute expanding the definition of 
obscenity by adding the words “to minors” to each provision did not invade freedom of expression). 
 64. Id. at 643 (adjusting the definition of obscene materials to include a prohibition on the sale of sexually 
explicit materials to minors). 
 65. Id.  
 66. See, e.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952) (discussing how motion pictures are 
one of the many media of speech that is protected by the First Amendment). 
 67. Jeffrey O’Holleran, Blood Code: The History and Future of Video Game Censorship, 8 J. TELECOMM. & 
HIGH TECH. L. 571, 580 (2010). 
 68. Id. at 583–84. 
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up until after the violent school shootings in high schools in the late 1990s.69 
Throughout the early and mid-2000s, Jack Thompson became famous for his 
campaign against violent video games and filed many suits on behalf of many 
victims violently murdered by perpetrators who may have been influenced by 
violent video games.70 Aside from a few laws, similar to the one in Brown, the only 
other attempt has been to place restrictions on the packaging of games considered 
to be particularly violent by the ESRB.71 
B. Legislative Acts That Propose Restrictions on Protected Categories of Speech Must 
Pass Strict Scrutiny by Having a Compelling Government Interest and Being Narrowly 
Tailored to Protect That Compelling Interest, a Two-Prong Test That Places a High 
Burden on the Government 
In First Amendment litigation, the burden is on the government to show that an act 
can pass strict scrutiny.72 The state must prove that the act is aimed at eliminating 
an actual problem.73 Also, the government must demonstrate that the means by 
which the act restricts speech is tailored in the narrowest way to solve this 
problem.74 An act is not narrowly tailored if it is underinclusive or overinclusive.75 
First, a plaintiff must show that there is an actual and compelling problem that 
the government seeks to remedy with the act in order to pass strict scrutiny.76 A 
legislature can show a compelling problem by the use of evidence in the form of 
case-studies and research by people deemed to be experts in a particular field.77 If a 
 
 69. Id. at 584. In the wake of tragedies such as the school shooting at Columbine, video game violence drew 
more attention and even became part of the 2000 presidential campaign. Id. 
 70. Id. at 586–93. Although he was disbarred for life due to the tactics he used in his cases, Jack Thompson 
was still an important figure in the fight against violent video games. He even helped work on some legislation 
against violent video games. Id. at 592–93. 
 71. See, e.g., Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d 646, 650?51 (E.D. Mich. 
2006) (citing Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001) and Interactive Digital 
Software Ass’n v. St. Louis County, 329 F.3d 954, 959 (8th Cir. 2003)) (holding video games were protected 
speech in a case that involved specific packaging restrictions for violent video games). 
 72. See generally United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000) (discussing that the 
plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the legislature has presented evidence of an actual problem that is in 
need of solving and the law is aimed at solving this problem). 
 73. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. 
REV. 2417, 2422 (1996) (“For a law to be narrowly tailored, the government must prove the Court’s satisfaction 
that the law actually advances the interest.” (footnote omitted)). 
 74. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992). 
 75. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546–47 (1993) (holding that a 
statute aimed at outlawing animal sacrifice in religious ceremonies is underinclusive, as the statute was aimed at 
discriminating against the Santeria religion, which uses animal sacrifice in its religious rituals). 
 76. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 818 (“When First Amendment compliance is the point to be proved, the risk of 
nonpersuasion—operative in all trials—must rest with the Government, not with the citizen.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 77. This is often done by presenting witness testimony at legislative committee hearings on the particular 
topic. See, e.g., Michael Dresser & Timothy B. Wheeler, Thousands Go to Annapolis for Gun-Control Rally and 
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court determines that the state has shown that a particular interest is compelling, 
the government has passed the first prong of the strict scrutiny test.78 
There are few statutes that have passed this first prong by showing that there is 
an actual and compelling government interest that the act protects. One such 
statute restricts the shipment or transportation of pornography depicting minors.79 
Conversely, the Court recently held in United States v. Alvarez80 that the Stolen 
Valor Act81 was unconstitutional, because it violated the First Amendment.82 The 
Stolen Valor Act made it a misdemeanor to falsely represent oneself as having 
received a United States military honor.83 Writing for the plurality, Justice Kennedy 
declared that the Court has never decided that speech falls outside of First 
Amendment protections based on falsity alone.84 What is particularly interesting in 
this case was the Court’s discussion of compelling government interest.85 The 
plurality emphasized how the First Amendment mandates that there must be a 
direct causal link between the restriction on speech between the act’s restriction and 
the injury that is to be prevented.86 In Alvarez, the Court determined that the link 
between protecting the military honors system and the Act’s restriction on false 
statements was not shown.87 This was largely due to the fact that the Government 
did not rely on much research, case studies, and expert testimony to show that 
punishing these false statements in order to uphold the U.S. military honor was a 
compelling government interest.88 
Next, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the piece of legislation is narrowly 
tailored to serve its interest.89 An act is narrowly drawn if it is not overinclusive or 
 
Hearing, BALT. SUN, Feb. 6, 2013, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-02-06/news/bs-md-omalley-guns-
20130204_1_assault-weapons-gun-control-gun-buyers (discussing a recent hearing on gun-control in 
Annapolis, Maryland and mentioning the process for legislative hearings). 
 78. See generally Volokh, supra note 73 (discussing how a law must pass strict scrutiny, including how a law 
must show a compelling government interest). 
 79. 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2006). In New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, the Court held that child pornography 
may be deemed obscene without first passing the Miller Test for several reasons, including that the government 
has a compelling interest in protecting children from sexual exploitation. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756 
(1992). 
 80. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). 
 81. 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2006), invalidated by Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2551. 
 82. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2551. 
 83. 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2006). 
 84. See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2540 (discussing how Stevens determined that there may exist some new 
categories of unprotected speech but stating that the Court has not yet examined false statements as one of these 
categories). 
 85. Id. at 2549–50. 
 86. Id at 2549 (“The lack of a causal link between the Government’s stated interest and the Act is not the 
only way in which the Act is not actually necessary to achieve the Government’s stated interest. The 
Government has not shown, and cannot show why counterspeech would not suffice to achieve its interest.”). 
 87. Id.  
 88. See id. (describing how the Government did not and could not show how punishing false statements 
served the end of protecting the military honors system). 
 89. See Volokh, supra note 73, at 2418. 
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underinclusive.90 An act is overinclusive if it includes types of speech that need not 
be prohibited by the statute.91 More specifically, “[a] law is not narrowly tailored if 
it restricts a significant amount of speech that doesn’t implicate the government 
interest.”92 For example, a law that prohibits a corporation from supporting or 
opposing a referendum proposal, because this support might influence an election 
outcome, could be considered overinclusive.93 It could be overinclusive, because the 
shareholders of the company could unanimously support this referendum outside 
of any desire to influence an election.94 Alternatively, a statute is underinclusive if it 
does not prohibit all types of like speech.95 Underinclusiveness can lead a court to 
doubt that a state is pursuing the interest that it states it wishes to protect with the 
enactment of a statute.96 For example, a statute that prohibits animal slaughter, but 
is so targeted that it only restricts the slaughter in the manner performed by a 
particular religion, is underinclusive.97 
Laws that are aimed at limiting minors’ access to violent video games are often 
derived from the test in Miller v. California, which sought to clarify and refine the 
definition of obscenity.98 The Miller Test has been used for decades to determine if a 
form of expression is obscene, and thus not protected by the First Amendment.99 
Generally, the Miller Test is a three-prong test that can be used to determine if 
whether expression can be labeled as obscene.100 The Miller Test is not as difficult to 
pass as strict scrutiny, and the Government has a much lower burden to prove in 
order to pass the test.101 However, this test is the standard used for free speech cases 
involving obscenity. In Ginsburg v. New York, the Court upheld the constitutionality 
 
 90. See Volokh, supra note 73, at 2422 (discussing how a law is not narrowly tailored if it is overinclusive by 
restricting speech that does not serve the government interest, and a law is not narrowly tailored if there are less 
restrictive means to reach the ends). 
 91. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 51 (1994) (holding that a law which prohibits an entire 
medium of speech, in this instance yard signs, is so overinclusive that it cannot be said to be narrowly tailored). 
 92. See Volokh, supra note 73, at 2422. 
 93. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978). 
 94. Id. 
 95. See Volokh, supra note 73, at 2431–32. 
 96. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546–47 (1993) (holding that a 
statute aimed at outlawing animal sacrifice in religious ceremonies is underinclusive, as the statute was aimed at 
discriminating against the Santeria religion, which uses animal sacrifice in its religious rituals). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36–37 (1973). 
 99. Id. at 24 (outlining the Miller Test which states, “[t]he basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) 
whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards would find that the work, taken as a 
whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, 
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks 
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value” (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957) 
(internal quotations omitted))). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Zachary B., The Miller Test and the Value of Obscene Speech, YALE LAW & TECHNOLOGY (Oct. 15, 2012), 
http://www.yalelawtech.org/uncategorized/the-miller-test-and-the-value-of-obscene-speech/. 
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of a New York statute that altered the Miller Test by adding the word “to minors” to 
each section of the test.102 The Court reasoned that the law was narrowly tailored in 
that it served its purpose of protecting minors.103 Thus, New York was successful in 
passing a law that banned the sale of “girly magazines” to minors by determining 
that these pornographic magazines were classified as obscene and not protected by 
the First Amendment.104 
III. The Court’s Reasoning 
In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, the Supreme Court declared that 
California’s violent video game act was unconstitutional because it violated the First 
Amendment’s Free Speech Clause.105 The Court determined that (1) violent video 
games qualify for first amendment protection,106 (2) new categories of unprotected 
speech may not be added,107 and (3) California did not satisfy its burden of proof by 
showing both that the law was justified by a compelling government interest and 
that it was narrowly tailored to serve that interest.108 
A. Violent Video Games Qualify for First Amendment Protection 
The Supreme Court began its analysis by recognizing that video games qualify for 
First Amendment Protection.109 The Court has long recognized that the Free Speech 
Clause protects forms of entertainment such as books, plays, and movies.110 This 
protection extends to video games, because the Freedom of Speech does not vary 
depending on medium.111 Further, “[g]overnment has no power to restrict 
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”112 
 
 
 
 
 
 102. 390 U.S. 629, 635 (1968) (determining that material that is constitutionally protected and may be 
distributed to adults is not always protected when it is distributed to minors). 
 103. Id. at 637. 
 104. Id. 
 105. 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2741–42 (2011). 
 106. Id. at 2733. 
 107. Id. at 2734. 
 108. Id. at 2738. 
 109. Id. at 2733. 
 110. Id.  
 111. Id.; see also Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952) (holding that the principle of 
freedom of speech does not vary when new and different media of speech are involved). 
 112. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2733 (citing Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002)). 
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B. New Categories of Unprotected Speech May Not Be Added to the Already-Existing 
List Absent a Historical Precedent That the Speech Is Unprotected 
The Court noted that there exist few categories of speech that are an exception to 
Freedom of Speech protection: obscenity, incitement, and fighting words.113 These 
classes are all well-defined and narrowly-tailored, and “the prevention and 
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional 
problem.”114 The Court relied on the holding in Stevens that new categories of 
unprotected speech may not be added to this list absent a history of exclusion from 
First Amendment protection, when the Court declined to afford First Amendment 
protection to the depiction of animal cruelty.115 The Court concluded that Stevens 
controlled this instant case.116 In both cases, the legislature modeled statutes after 
obscenity regulation,117 but obscenity only covers depictions of “sexual conduct” 
and not depictions of animal cruelty or violent video games.118 Although the 
definition of obscenity can be adjusted, the Court has long determined that the 
definition of obscenity does not include the depiction of violent acts.119 The Court 
determined that the California Act attempted to create an entirely new category of 
speech aimed at protecting children.120 The Court recognized that the legislature has 
a legitimate power to protect children, but “[it] does not include a free-floating 
power to restrict the ideas to which children may be exposed.”121 
Next, the Court examined other media that depict violent acts protected by the 
Free Speech Clause.122 Grimm’s Fairy Tales, Snow White, The Odyssey, The Inferno, 
and Lord of the Flies are all books containing violence that are regularly consumed 
by minors and are protected by the First Amendment.123 However, the Court 
 
 113. Id.; see also Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
 114. Id. (citing Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72). 
 115. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2734; United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1592 (2010). 
 116. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2734. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 2734–35; see also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
 119. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2736; Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 517–19 (1947). 
 120. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2736. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 2736–37. 
 123. Id.; DANTE ALIGHIERI, THE DIVINE COMEDY, Inferno, Cantos XXXIV, ls. 56–59 (Tom Griffith ed., 
Reverend H. F. Cary trans., Wordsworth Classics of World Literature 2009) (1472) (depicting the main 
character’s journey through hell, and containing a particularly graphic scene in which Satan is gnawing the 
bodies of “the traitors,” including Brutus, Cassius, and Judas Iscariot); WILLIAM GOLDING, LORD OF THE FLIES 
163 (Penguin 3rd ed. 1999) (describing a violent scene in which young boys stranded on an island turn against 
each other, which eventually leads to the brutal death of one of the boys being crushed by a boulder pushed by 
another boy); JACOB GRIMM & WILHELM GRIMM, THE COMPLETE FAIRY TALES OF THE BROTHERS GRIMM 53–59 
(Jack Zipes trans., 3rd ed. 2003) (containing the story of Hansel & Gretel, in which two young children burn a 
cannibalistic witch in a wood stove stating, “[t]he ungodly witch to be burned to ashes”); HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 
(Lillian E. Doherty ed., Oxford Readings in Classic Studies 2009) (1488) (depicting many scenes with violence 
including Odysseus blinding the Cyclops with a wooden stake and Odysseus shooting all of his lover’s suitors 
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recognized that these and other works depicting violence such as dime novels, radio 
shows, movies, television, and song lyrics have all encountered resistance over the 
years.124 California argued that video games are different because of their interactive 
qualities.125 The Court rejected this stating that violent, interactive literature has 
been around since the 1960s with choose-your-own-adventure novels.126 The Court 
asserted that video games are not a different degree or kind of interactive 
technology that is different than other media such as literature,127 citing Judge 
Posner’s statement that “the better it is, the more interactive. Literature when it is 
successful draws the reader into the story, makes him identify with the characters, 
invites him to judge them and quarrel with them, to experience their joys and 
sufferings as the reader’s own.”128 Finally, the Court dismissed Justice Alito’s 
position that video games are extremely violent.129 
C. California Did Not Satisfy Its Burden of Proof by Showing That Either the Law Was 
Justified by a Compelling Government Interest and That It Was Narrowly Tailored to 
Serve That Interest 
The Court held that the Act imposed a restriction on the content of the speech.130 
Thus, the Act had to pass strict scrutiny by demonstrating a compelling government 
interest and be narrowly tailored to serve that interest in order to be 
constitutional.131 The Court admitted that the Act had a compelling state interest to 
protect youth,132 but California did not meet its burden of showing that the law was 
justified by this compelling government reason.133 California relied on evidence and 
studies by psychologists to show a connection between exposure to violent video 
games and harmful effects to children, but this evidence was not compelling.134 
Although the studies showed a slight correlation in miniscule effects, such as 
children making louder noises after playing violent video games,135 the Court 
 
with a bow and arrows). Grimm’s Fairy Tales also contain the story of Snow White in which an evil Queen is 
forced to dance in a pair of hot iron shoes until she drops dead. GRIMM & GRIMM, supra 264–73. 
 124. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2737 (discussing that in the 1800s, dime novels were blamed for juvenile 
delinquency, motion pictures were accused of easily influencing minors and leading them to prison, and other 
media such as the radio and comic books were long thought to foster violent behavior of youths). 
 125. Id.  
 126. Id. at 2737–38. Choose-your-own-adventure novels are books that offer various choices to the author 
that may all result in alternate endings of the story.  
 127. Id. at 2737–38. 
 128. Id. (citing Am. Amusement Mach. Assn. v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 2001)). 
 129. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2742–51 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 130. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2738 (majority opinion). 
 131. Id.  
 132. Id. at 2741. 
 133. Id. at 2738. 
 134. Id. at 2739. 
 135. Id. 
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determined that the studies did not demonstrate a true connection between playing 
violent video games and aggressive actions by minors.136 Thus, the Court reasoned 
California could not show that the Act was narrowly tailored to meet its burden of 
showing that the Act was justified by a compelling legislative interest with 
supporting evidence.137 
The Act was not narrowly tailored because it was both underinclusive and 
overinclusive.138 The Act was underinclusive, because it singled out video game 
sellers instead of restricting sellers of all types of violent material, and California did 
not show a compelling reason why it chose to do this.139 Further, the Act was 
underinclusive, because it allowed minors to have access to these video games as 
long as one parent consented without providing any information on how the 
parent-child relationship was to be identified.140 Lastly, the Court determined that 
the Act was overinclusive141 because it restricted all minors from purchasing violent 
video games when not all minors have parents who actually care if their children 
play violent video games.142 
The Court ended by stating that this is one statute in a long series of attempts to 
censor violent entertainment from children that have failed.143 The Court stated that 
it does not intend to imply that protecting minors from violence was not a valid 
concern of the court,144 but it was only the role of the Court to determine whether 
California’s Act was unconstitutional.145 California showed a legitimate legislative 
concern that it sought to protect, but the Act was not narrowly tailored to fully 
address these concerns.146 
D. Concurrence of Justice Alito 
Justice Alito concurred with the majority that this particular law was not framed 
with the precision that the Constitution demands and it could not be sustained.147 
Justice Alito concluded that the Act failed to provide the fair notice that the 
 
 136. Id. (citing Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2009)) (stating that 
“the same effects have been found when children watch cartoons starring Bugs Bunny or the Road Runner, or 
when they play video games like Sonic the Hedgehog that are rated [appropriate for all ages], or even when they 
‘vie[w] a picture of a gun’”). 
 137. Id. at 2738. 
 138. Id. at 2740. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 2741. 
 142. Id. at 2742. 
 143. Id. at 2741. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 2742. 
 147. Id. at 2742 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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Constitution required.148 However, he strongly cautioned the Court not to 
prematurely conclude that violent video games are the same as any other type of 
media, such as books.149 
Justice Alito elaborated on his point that violent video games are constantly-
developing and have emerging characteristics that the Court too quickly dismissed 
as nothing new and hastily concluded that all types of literature are interactive.150 He 
provided examples from particularly violent video games and discussed how the 
interactive experiences in these games are quite different than reading about a 
violent murder in a book.151 Thus, Justice Alito only went so far as to declare the Act 
unconstitutional and did not want to “squelch legislative efforts to deal with what is 
perceived by some to be a significant and developing social problem.”152 
E. Dissent of Justice Thomas 
In his dissent, Justice Thomas concluded that the First Amendment has not 
historically protected “speech to minor children bypassing their parents.”153 Justice 
Thomas extensively examined how speech to minor children has been protected 
throughout history and concluded that the issue was largely up to the discretion of 
the parent with a variety of laws aimed at preserving parental control of minors.154 
He concluded that because this category of speech has never been constitutionally 
protected, California’s violent video game act does not implicate the First 
Amendment and was not facially unconstitutional.155 
F. Dissent of Justice Breyer 
Justice Breyer would have upheld the statute as facially constitutional but rejected 
the challenges of the violent video game industry.156 Justice Breyer agreed that the 
Court correctly held that the Act cannot pass the strict scrutiny that the 
Constitution demands,157 but he recognized the difficulty of mounting a facial attack 
on an activity that involves action and speech.158 He discussed how he would have 
 
 148. Id. at 2746. 
 149. Id. at 2742. 
 150. Id. at 2748. 
 151. Id. at 2748–50 (discussing various video games that are currently on the market in which the goals and 
themes of some of these games include murdering in particularly violent fashions, raping women and children, 
ethnic cleansing, and reenacting the assassination of President Kennedy and the massacre at Columbine High 
School). 
 152. Id. at 2751. 
 153. Id. at 2751 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 154. Id. at 2752–60. 
 155. Id. at 2761. 
 156. Id. at 2761 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 157. Id. at 2762. 
 158. Id. 
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applied both strict scrutiny and a vagueness requirement to this case.159 Justice 
Breyer emphasized that California’s statute provides fair notice and is not overly 
vague.160 
IV. Analysis 
The Court correctly concluded that the Act did not pass the strict scrutiny required 
of laws that place restrictions on speech.161 However, in reaching this result, the 
Court too quickly determined that violent video games are equivalent to other 
media of protected speech and failed to explore the possibility that this relatively 
new medium of speech may pose new and different challenges.162 If a state wishes to 
pass a law restricting minors’ access to violent video games, the law must be 
narrowly tailored so that it can pass strict scrutiny,163 and one way to do this would 
be to model it after other successful statutes, such as the New York statute that 
restricts minors access to obscenity.164 
A. The Court Reached the Correct Result That the Act Regulating Content of Violent 
Video Games Did Not Pass Strict Scrutiny and Was Unconstitutional 
The Court correctly held that laws aimed at restricting the sale of violent video 
games are an unconstitutional restriction on content.165 It was previously decided 
that content-based restrictions on speech must past strict scrutiny to be considered 
constitutional, and the California Act did not pass this level of scrutiny.166 The 
government attempted to argue the compelling interest of protecting minors from 
harm resulting from playing violent video games, but California’s evidence was 
insufficient to show the Court that violent video games and harm to minors are 
directly related.167 The studies presented were inconclusive and showed a small 
 
 159. Id. (referring to the Court's vagueness doctrine, which states that a law restricting speech is 
overinclusive when it is too general and not narrowly tailored to target the specific classification of speech the 
law seeks to prevent). 
 160. Id. at 2763. 
 161. Infra Part IV.A. 
 162. Infra Part IV.B. 
 163. Infra Part IV.C. 
 164. Infra Part IV.C. 
 165. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2733 (majority opinion) (“Like the protected books, plays, and movies that 
preceded them, video games communicate ideas—and even social messages—through many familiar literary 
devices . . . and through features distinctive to the medium . . . [t]hat suffice[] to confer First Amendment 
protection.”); see also Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952) (holding that the protections of 
the First Amendment do not vary for a new or different medium of communication). 
 166. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2733; R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992) (holding that for a statute 
to pass strict scrutiny, it must have a compelling government interest and be narrowly drawn to serve that 
interest). 
 167. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2738; see also United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 826–27 
(2000) (holding that even if the government interest of protecting children is compelling, a law must comport 
with the First Amendment and infringe on the freedom of speech by the least-restrictive means). 
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causal connection between violent video games and “loud noises” or “increased 
agitation” for several minutes after playing a violent video game.168 Thus, the Court 
correctly determined that the evidence was simply not strong enough to support a 
compelling government interest. Further, the Court reached the correct outcome 
that the Act was not narrowly tailored in the least restrictive way possible.169 The Act 
is overinclusive in the fact that it assumes all parents with children who wish to play 
violent video games actually care that their children are playing these games.170 The 
Court notes that there are some children that may be restricted from buying these 
games who have parents that do not care if their children are playing violent 
videogames, thus, the act is overinclusive.171 The Court correctly held the Act to be 
underinclusive by the fact that it excludes portrayals of violence aimed at children 
other than violence in video games.172 
B. In Reaching This Result, the Court Too Quickly Assumed That Violent Video Games 
Are the Same as Other Media of Speech That Portray Violence, and Instead the Court 
Should Have Deferred to the Legislature 
In his concurrence, Justice Alito questions the wisdom of the Court’s decision and 
recognizes the important need for the Court to “proceed with caution” in an “effort 
to understand the new technology . . . [that] may have important societal 
implications that will become apparent only with time.”173 Justice Alito stated, 
“there are reasons to suspect that the experience of playing violent video games just 
might be very different from reading a book, listening to the radio, or watching a 
movie or a television show.”174 This argument stems from the Justices’ beliefs that 
violent video games are the same as other media of speech.175 Instead of quickly 
dismissing video games as being similar to other media depicting violence,176 the 
Court should have deferred to the legislature and its studies in determining that 
video games present a new and different challenge than other forms of media 
available to minors that depict violence.177 
 
 168. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2739. 
 169. Id. at 2738. 
 170. Id. at 2741. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 2742. 
 173. Id. (Alito, J., concurring). 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 2737–38 (majority opinion) (“California claims that video games present special problems 
because they are ‘interactive,’ in that the player participates in the violent action on screen and determines its 
outcome. The latter feature is nothing new: Since at least the publication of The Adventures of You: Sugarcane 
Island in 1969, young readers of choose-your-own-adventure stories have been able to make decisions that 
determine the plot by following instructions about which page to turn to.”). 
 177. See infra footnotes 178–213 and accompanying text. 
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Video games are a relatively new technology, and have advanced rapidly over the 
past decades.178 Although the first “video game” was released in 1958,179 they did not 
gain commercial popularity until the first arcade games were released in the 1970s, 
followed by the first video game consuls in the same decade.180 In the last four 
decades, video games have advanced from simple games like Pong to games where 
interactive worlds, which look almost indistinguishable from reality can be created, 
manipulated, and altered by the player.181 The array of options available to a player 
in a violent video game are far greater than those in a “choose-your-own-
adventure-book,” which the Court argues is similar to a violent video game.182 All of 
the options of one of these adventure books are contained between the two covers 
of the short volume, while the possibilities available to a minor playing a modern 
video game are virtually endless.183 
One of the most distinct differences between violent video games and other 
medium of speech available to minors is the interactivity that video games 
provide.184 Reading a book or listening to the radio requires the user to use his 
imagination to develop a mental picture of the world being described, while video 
games provide visualizations for the user.185 Although television and movies provide 
displays, they do not possess the interactive element that video games allow.186 Even 
DVDs sold with the capability of watching alternate endings are limited by the 
options made available by the creator.187 
 
 178. Mark Claypool & Robert W. Lindeman, Panel Discussion, IMGD 1001: Game Development Timeline at 
the Worcester Polytechnic Institute, WORCESTER POLYTECHNIC INST., http://web.cs.wpi.edu/~imgd1001/a08/ 
slides/imgd1001_04_GameDevTimeline.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2013) (providing a timeline of the 
development of video games and advancements in video game technology over the last several decades). 
 179. See Kristin Kalning, The Anatomy of the First Video Game, MSNBC (Oct. 23, 2008), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27328345/ns/technology_and_science-games/t/anatomy-first-video-game 
(describing the first video game, “Tennis for Two,” that predates “Pong” and “Space Invaders”). 
 180. John Anderson, Who Really Invented the Video Game, CREATIVE COMPUTING VIDEO & ARCADE GAMES, 
Spring 1983, at 8, available at,http://www.digitpress.com/library/magazines/ccvag/ccvag_spring83.pdf. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011). 
 183. See James Dunkelberger, The New Resident Evil? State Regulation of Violent Video Games and the First 
Amendment 2011 BYU L. REV. 1659, 1675 (2011) (discussing how there is an ever-increasing range of choice as 
video games continue to develop); see also History of CYOA, CHOOSE YOUR OWN ADVENTURE, 
http://www.cyoa.com/pages/history-of-cyoa (last visited Mar. 5, 2013) (describing the format of Choose Your 
Own Adventure books and general statistics about the books). 
 184. See Dunkelberger, supra note 183, at 1674–79 (describing how video games have a level of interactivity 
that is not present in other media of speech). 
 185. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2748 (Alito, J., concurring) (“These games feature visual imagery and sounds that 
are strikingly realistic, and in the near future video-game graphics may be virtually indistinguishable from 
actual video footage.” (footnote omitted)). 
 186. See generally Dunkelberger, supra note 183, at 1674–79 (discussing the ever-increasing interactivity of 
video games). 
 187. See generally Orin S. Kerr, A Theory of Law, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 111 (2012). 
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Specifically, violent video games provide a wide array of options that are new 
and much different than other forms of “speech.”188 Some of the newest 
interactive video games allow the player to experience a virtual word complete 
with sight, sound, touch, and smell, which goes even further beyond what a 
person can experience from the media of television or movies that are considered 
to be protected by the First Amendment.189 Recent design platforms and their 
extensions such as Microsoft’s Kinect allow the user to play without the use of a 
gamepad by measuring the player’s full body movements.190 Further, certain 
platforms of the game Resident Evil 4 provide users with a chainsaw-shaped 
controller so that they can better simulate attacking and cutting up zombies in the 
game.191 Artificial intelligence allows for unscripted interaction between the game 
player and characters in the video games.192 There is currently no magazine, book, 
television show, or movie that allows for the consumer to experience all of 
sensory options at one time while acting out tasks involving all five senses in 
unscripted and practically uncontrolled environments. These examples help to 
show that video games differ materially from protected mediums of speech such 
as books, movies, and television.193 
The Court should have deferred to the legislature or evidence produced by 
experts in the video game industry before determining that violent video games are 
virtually the same as other mediums depicting violence that is aimed at minors.194 
What the Court terms as Justice Alito’s attempt to describe violent video games to 
disgust the Court,195 is actually just a statement of the astounding examples of 
violence that are present in some of these graphic video games.196 Minors have 
 
 188. See generally Robert Bryan Norris, Jr., Note, It’s All Fun and Games Until Someone Gets Hurt: Brown v. 
Entertainment Merchants Association and the Problem of Interactivity, 13 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 81, 85 (2011) 
(discussing the advancements in video game technology and how it is different than other traditional media of 
speech). 
 189. Id. (stating that technologically advanced video games of today are employing the use of every sense of 
the user during gameplay). 
 190. Id. at 87. 
 191. Id. at 87–88. 
 192. Id. at 89–91 (discussing how artificial intelligence and physics have helped video game developers 
create extremely advanced and interactive video games). 
 193. Id. at 96–101 (describing various ways in which video games are different than the other previously-
protected media of speech). 
 194. See id. at 95–96 (discussing how the Court’s sweeping statement about how video games don’t pose any 
different challenges than other media of speech further complicated the problem of how these violent video 
games should be treated). 
 195. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2749 (2011) (Alito, J., concurring) (noting the extreme 
violence in some of these video games, Justice Alito stated, “[i]n some of these games, the violence is 
astounding. Victims by the dozens are killed with every imaginable implement, including machine guns, 
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access to video games that allow the user to act out the killings at Columbine High 
School,197 rape women,198 and engage in forms of “ethnic cleansing” by gunning 
down members of a particular race or ethnicity.199 
Evidence and studies conducted by experts in the video game industry have 
shown that video game violence is quite different from violence depicted in other 
media such as television or books.200 There were thirty-one amici curiae briefs filed 
in the Brown case, and some of these were studies conducted by psychologists and 
other experts measuring the effects of violent video games on children.201 The main 
brief in support of the government, known as the “Gruel Brief,” authored by 
thirteen highly recognized media violence experts around the world, focused on 
how violent video games can increase violent behavior in children.202 The Gruel 
Brief specifically focused on the correlation between violent behavior, nightmares, 
outburst, and an increased violence toward women.203 The main brief supporting 
VSDA and ESA, known as the “Millett Brief,” was endorsed by eighty-two 
psychologists and determined that there was no significant statistical increase in 
violent behavior of children who played violent video games.204 Unfortunately, there 
is very little statistical evidence provided in either brief about the actual impact that 
violent video games have on children, further supporting the fact that there is 
simply not enough information about the effects of this relatively new technology.205 
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Another recent study examined the impact of a virtual reality program, Virtual 
Iraq, on soldiers returning from war and instances of post-traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD).206 The Virtual Iraq program involves patients wearing a headset and being 
exposed to sounds, images, smells, and vibrations that are controlled by a doctor to 
simulate some of the experiences soldiers experienced while in Iraq or 
Afghanistan.207 The therapy sessions last for one hour, and after the patients talk 
about their experiences with a doctor and psychologist.208 The goal of the program is 
to reduce the instances of PTSD in members of the U.S. military returning from 
combat.209 A study of the results of Virtual Iraq determined that around 80% of 
program participants demonstrated a statistical and clinical reduction in PTSD, 
anxiety, and depression.210 Although this study offers some statistical evidence about 
the impact of video game violence on individuals, it does not specifically address the 
impact that violent video games could have on children.211 Other than a handful of 
studies that attempt to measure the effects of video game violence on individuals, 
there is very little empirical evidence about their impact on minors.212 Thus, the 
relatively new technology of video games should have been studied further before 
the Court made the sweeping assertion that violent video games are essentially the 
same as other media of speech and should be treated accordingly.213 
C. If a State Wishes to Regulate Violent Video Game Distribution to Minors, the 
Statute Must Be Narrowly Tailored to Specific Depictions of Violence and Obscenity 
The only current regulation on video games is the self-regulatory Entertainment 
Software Rating Board (ESRB) system.214 California’s Act was the latest of many 
failed attempts to impose a mandatory rating system aimed at prohibiting minors 
from purchasing violent video games without parental permission.215 In order for a 
state to succeed in getting a statute to pass the strict scrutiny that the Constitution 
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demands, it will have to take a different approach than those that have been 
previously attempted. 
As discussed previously, Ginsberg upheld as constitutional an act which 
regulated the sale of pornographic materials to minors and expanded the 
definition of obscenity to include pornography distributed to minors.216 The 
statute in question expanded on the original and often-criticized Miller Test.217 
Although California attempted to similarly extend on the statute in Miller as it 
was done in Ginsberg, the Court declared that the Act sought to create an entirely 
new category of unprotected speech.218 There is great irony in the fact that the 
justice system will protect expression that allows a minor to actively participate in 
the violent murder and dismemberment of a body, but if the victim happens to be 
topless, the Government’s interest in protecting minors suddenly supersedes First 
Amendment protection.219 
In order to combat this, states should seek to more closely align statutes aimed at 
regulating violent video games with the way that the statute in Ginsburg only altered 
the obscenity statute in Miller by adding the words “to minors.”220 States could 
begin by attempting to regulate violent video games that contain pornography and 
appeal to the “prurient interest” or depict acts of sexual violence.221 As mentioned, 
many of the violent video games discussed by Justice Alito, and countless more 
contain not just violence but interactive scenes with nudity and violent rape, which 
could be targeted by states in future laws that attempt to restrict violent video game 
sales to minors.222 If a state were to more narrowly tailor a statute to protect the 
interest of minors by restricting violent video games that contain obscenity, the 
statute would have a greater chance of passing the strict scrutiny that laws 
restricting the content of speech must pass. 
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Conclusion 
In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, the Supreme Court held that 
California’s Act regulating violent video game sales to minors without parental 
permission was unconstitutional.223 The Court correctly concluded that California’s 
Act does not pass the strict scrutiny that is required of laws that attempt to regulate 
expression protected by the First Amendment.224 However, the Court too quickly 
dismissed the possibility that video games are unlike other media of speech.225 The 
Court should not have broadly dismissed violent video games as being akin to other 
mediums depicting violence and should have deferred to the experts in the industry 
and the legislature before making such a sweeping generalization.226 
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